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I. INTRODUCTION
As the practice of law becomes increasingly competitive, the profes-
sion is changing dramatically.' Less than one year after his appointment
t The author received the 1996 Jonathan Weitzman Professional Responsi-
bility Writing Award for this Note.
1. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 54-55 (1991); ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN
ON LAWYER MOBILITY: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF PARTNER WITHDRAWALS AND LAw FIRM
BREAKUPS § 1.1 (1996); ANTHONYT KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF
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as ChiefJustice of the U.S. Supreme Court, William Rehnquist said, "Insti-
tutional loyalty appears to be in decline. Partners in law firms have be-
come increasingly 'mobile,' feeling much freer than they formerly did and
having much greater opportunity than they formerly did, to shift from
one firm to another and to take revenue-producing clients with them."2
The dramatic changes in the profession are reflected by the breakup of
large, established law firms, the creation of an unprecedented free-agent
market for rainmaker partners who bring in bulging portfolios of well-
paying clients, and the increasing structural pressures on law firms to
compete for clients.3 The more the practice of law is organized on a busi-
ness basis, the more likely it is that ethical considerations will conflict with
profit-driven activities.4 The professional ethical codes that constrained
these pressures in the past no longer seem to function.5
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 277-81 (1993); SOL M. LINOwITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE
BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 100-12
(1994); Steven Brill, The Partner Breakup Follies, AM. LAw., Mar. 1988, at 3.
2. William H. Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62 IND. L.J. 151, 152
(1987).
3. See HILLMAN, supra note 1, § 1:1, at 1:1 ("Law firms are under siege. The
traditional view of the law firm as a stable institution with an assured future is now
challenged by an awareness that even the largest and most prestigious firms are
fragile economic units facing a myriad of risks in their quests to survive and pros-
per."); see also Steven P. Handler, et al., The Ethics of Solicitation of Business from Corpo-
rate Clients, 5 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHics 423, 423 (1991) ("Both clients and lawyers have
increasingly become willing to break longstanding ties to law firms. At the same
time, those firms have had to grapple with skyrocketing costs associated with com-
puterization, inflated rents and salary wars for top law school graduates. These
changes have ushered in the 'Era of the Rainmaker."'); James W. Jones, The Chal-
lenge of Change: The Practice of Law in the Year 2000, 41 VAND. L. REv. 683, 688 (1988)
("The concept of the 'portable practice' and the increasing willingness of lawyers
to leave their current firms to work for the highest bidding competitors have cre-
ated a whole new growth industry in legal recruitment services."); Briefly...,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 1991, at 47, 48 (describing an "unseemly fight over a projected
$4 million to $6 million fee" that exploded between two nationally prominent
firms over the manner in which a departing partner took clients and cases to that
partner's new firm); Gail Diane Cox, Smile When You Say That, Partner, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 3, 1989, at 1 (detailing the mudslinging between Lord, Day & Lord and Win-
throp, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts "[i] n what may have been the most embarrass-
ing performance of 1988 by two silk-stocking firms"); Douglas Linton, Loyal No
Longer, MANHATrAN LAW., Apr. 1991, at 3 (describing an interview with a former
partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, who left with an estimated $5 mil-
lion in client business to join another Manhattan law firm).
4. See Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 154 ("It is only natural... that as the prac-
tice of law in large firms has become organized on more and more of a business
basis, geared to the maximization of income, this practice should on occasion
push towards the margins of ethical propriety.... [T] he stronger the pressure to
maximize income the more difficult it is to avoid the ethical margins.").
5. The codes of professional responsibility for attorneys, promulgated by the
American Bar Association (ABA), require that the profession's members put the
[Vol. 23
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The decline of loyalty has generated at least four pernicious dividends:
increased public distrust and cynicism about attorneys, increased cynicism
about the law profession within the profession itself, increased business risks
to law firms, and increased instability and dissolution of law firms.6 These
form a vicious circle: as business risks to law firms increase, more attorneys
feel the need to protect themselves individually by any means necessary, in-
cluding leaving their firms with clients in tow.7 The more that attorneys
protect themselves in this way, the greater the business risks become; the
greater the business risks, the more attorneys feel the need to protect them-
selves.8
Law firms of all sizes, understandably concerned about protecting
their business interests, have responded to these problems by including
noncompetition agreements in their partnership and employment
agreements.9 These agreements, routinely employed by other profes-
sional firms including medical practices and accounting firms, restrict a
departing partner from establishing a competing practice and from repre-
senting former clients of the firm. If that partner violates the agreement,
the firm may demand restitution.'0 The increased number of attorneys
moving between firms has caused noncompetition agreements to flourish,
as law firms have sought to inhibit streams of attorneys from easily trans-
ferring between firms."
client and the legal system above the attorney's own interests. This is a necessary
element of professionalism and distinguishes a profession from a business. See
Freeman v. Freeman, 311 N.E.2d 480, 483 (N.Y 1974). "A profession is not a busi-
ness. It is distinguished by... a code of ethics imposing standards qualitatively
and extensively beyond those that prevail or are tolerated in the market-
place... [and] a duty to subordinate financial reward to social responsibility .... "
Id. Many commentators have discussed the declining influence of ethical stan-
dards on the conduct of attorneys. See Laurel S. Terry, Ethical Pitfalls and Malprac-
tice Consequences of Law Firm Breakups, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 1055, 1062-1109 (1988); An-
thony L. Marks, Comment, Barefoot Shoemakers: An Uncompromising Approach to Polic-
ing the Morals of the Marketplace When Law Firms Split Up, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 509, 510-27
(1987); Kirstan Penasack, Note, Abandoning the Per Se Rule Against Law Firm Agree-
ments Anticipating Competition: Comment on Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, 5 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHIcS 889, 899-909 (1992).
6. See HILLMAN, supra note 1, § 1:1, at 1:2 ("Law firms, in short, are in tur-
moil, and many of their problems arise from within the firms themselves.").
7. See Penasack, supra note 5, at 890.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 891 (describing covenants not to compete in law firm partner-
ship agreements). "Noncompetition agreements," "restraints on competition,"
"noncompetition provisions," "covenants not to compete," and "noncompetition
covenants" are used interchangeably in this paper and, generally, in ethical rules,
statutory regulations, and the common law.
10. See id.
11. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 157 (Cal. 1993) (explaining that
noncompetition agreements have become common, despite the nearly universal
recognition by courts and ethics committees that such agreements are unenforce-
1997]
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Problematic for law firms is the adoption by courts and legal ethics
committees of a per se rule that invalidates attorney noncompetition
agreements as a violation of public policy.12 The rule is driven by three
strong policies: clients must be free to choose and discharge their attor-
neys;'- attorneys have an unwaivable interest in freedom of movement to
practice their profession; 4 and the public has a justifiable interest in pre-
venting monopolies and restrictions on production.15 The principle of
client choice is cited most frequently as the primary reason for the ethical
ban prohibiting the enforcement of these agreements. 16 The American
Bar Association addressed noncompetition agreements in 1961 and
promulgated model codes, which include the per se rule.' For the next
able); see also Terry, supra note 5, at 1075 (stating that noncompetition agreements
"have been used in two-person firms, mid-size firms, and even legal clinics").
12. The rule is an absolute bar to enforcement of any limitation on a client's
right to choice of counsel and any restriction on an attorney's right to practice. See
Serena L. Kafker, Golden Handcuffs: Enforceability of Noncompetition Clauses in Profes-
sional Partnership Agreements of Accountants, Physicians, and Attorneys, 31 AM. Bus. L.J.
31, 52 (1993).
13. Both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct provide that clients are free to discharge their attorneys at
any time and, thus, no firm or attorney may claim a possessory interest in a client.
See MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(4) (1969)
(amended 1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(3)
(1983). "Although the firm may refer to clients of the firm as 'the firm's clients,'
clients are not the 'possession' of anyone, but, to the contrar-; control who will
represent them." Kelly v. Smith, 611 N.E.2d 118, 122 (Ind. 1993).
14. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 160 (finding that one purpose of the ban on non-
competition agreements is to assure attorneys the right to practice their profession
where they choose); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1072
(1968) ("The attorney must remain free to practice when and where he will and to
be available to prospective clients who might desire to engage his services.").
15. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REv.
625, 627, 654 (1960). Professor Blake's article is one of the seminal surveys of the
area. Some of the other excellent articles on the general subject of noncompeti-
tion agreements include: Eliot Freidson, Theory and the Professions, 64 IND. L.J. 423
(1989); Harvey J. Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected Stepchild: A Proposal for Dealing
with Restrictive Covenants Under Federal Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1973); Milton
Handler & Daniel E. Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, 57 N.YU. L. REv. 669 (1982).
16. See, e.g., HILLMAN, supra note 1, § 2.3, at 2:20-:21. But see Comm. on Pro-
fessional Responsibility, Ass'n of the Bar of City of N.Y, Ethical Issues Arising When a
Lawyer Leaves a Firm: Restrictions on Practice, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897, 909 (1993)
("The major justification for the rule is to promote a lawyer's personal auton-
omy.... ").
17. The per se ban on noncompetition agreements dates from 1961, when
the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics declared that post-employment cove-
nants restricting competition were per se invalid. ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961). In 1969, the ABA formally adopted its Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, which included a disciplinary rule addressing
noncompetition agreements. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
[Vol. 23
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thirty years, courts and legislatures embraced this rule," and every state's
legal ethics code prohibited the use of covenants not to compete.'
9
Recently, however, several courts and commentators have begun a
push toward abandoning the ethical prohibitions against noncompetition
agreements. Since 1991, three courts have held that attorney noncompe-
tition agreements that impose an "economic consequence" - but do not
exert an outright ban on competition - are enforceable.0 Concurrently, a
2-108 (1969). In order to increase professionalism (or at least the perception of
professionalism) in the practice of law, the ABA in 1983 adopted the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, which included a rule regarding restrictions on the right
to practice law. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6 (1983)
(amended 1990). Minnesota adopted the model code in 1970 as the Minnesota
Code of Professional Responsibility, which included the exact language of the
model code's DR 2-108. MINN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108
(1970). In 1985, Minnesota adopted the model rules as its Rules of Professional
Conduct, and adopted model rule 5.6 verbatim as Minnesota rule 5.6, the current
Minnesota rule regarding noncompetition agreements among attorneys. MINN.
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6 (1985). Only one published Minnesota
opinion has to date cited Minnesota rule 5.6. See Barna, Guzy & Steffen, Ltd. v.
Beens, 541 N.W.2d 354, 356-57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
18. Courts have concluded that the codes' implicit public policy goal - to
protect a client's right to her choice of counsel - is advanced by invalidating non-
competition agreements that conflict with the rule. See Cohen v. Lord, Day &
Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411 (N.Y 1989); Hagen v. O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, 683
P.2d 563, 565 (Or. Ct. App. 1984). Courts and legislatures have adopted the codes
to "[measure] authoritatively ... a lawyer's liability to professional discipline."
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 51 (1986).
19. See Robert W. Hillman, The Law Firm as Jurassic Park: Comments on Howard
v. Babock, 27 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 533, 535 (1994); see also Oregon State Bar Ass'n,
Formal Ethics Op. 29 (1991), available in 1991 WL 279170 (finding that attorney
covenants against competition are impermissible, and law firm partnerships are
prohibited from requiring a withdrawing attorney to pay any penalty as a precon-
dition to competing with former firm); OLAvI MARu, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION
ETHICS OPINIONS No. 10126, at 493 (Supp. 1975) (citing Va. State Bar Standing
Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1556 (1994), in VA. CODE ANN., LEGAL ETHICS &
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OPINIONS (Michie Added Vol. 1996)) (stating that it is
improper for an attorney to enter into an employment agreement with a law firm
where the attorney was precluded from practicing in the same geographical area
as that firm after the attorney had terminated employment with another firm).
The Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, charged by the Minne-
sota Supreme Court with addressing issues of attorneys' professional conduct, has
to date issued no formal opinions regarding these agreements.
20. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 161 (Cal. 1993); Haight, Brown &
Bonesteel v. Superior Court, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845, 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Jacob v.
Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 588 A.2d 1287, 1293 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991), rev'd, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992). An economic consequence is a cost, the
reasonableness of which is in the eye of the beholder, assessed against a departing
attorney for competing with his former partners within a prescribed geographical
area. For example, a noncompetition agreement may provide that if the depart-
ing attorney chooses later to represent a client of the former firm, that attorney
forfeits the right to receive any interest he otherwise would have been entitled to
19971
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rising tide of commentary in the professional literature has demanded
that the per se rule be discarded and that these agreements be analyzed
under the ordinary "rule of reason" test.2 ' The rule of reason's advocates
claim this radical shift is necessary, because the "revolution" in the prac-
tice of law has left law firms vulnerable and in need of judicial protec-
22tion.
What has been missing since 1961, however, is a serious judicial effort
to balance, consistent with the per se rule's underlying philosophy, the
four competing interests surrounding the enforceability of these agree-
ments. These interests are: the client's interest in freedom of choice; the
attorney's interest in professional autonomy; the law firm's interest in a
stable client base and in protection from withdrawing partners; and the
in the firm's capital accounts and accounts receivable. See Haight, 285 Cal. Rptr. at
846. One commentator equates competition with "economic injury" to the former
partners, because the departing attorney "can release herself from mutually in-
curred liabilities and then also both reap the benefits of taking former clients and
dip back into her former firm's shrinking profits by retaining a withdrawal pay-
ment," and argues that an economic consequence is rightful so long as it provides
"legitimate recompense." See Penasack, supra note 5, at 912. However, many
courts have little patience for this kind of logic. "[C]onstruing the forfeiture
clause in the firm's partnership agreement as a 'financial disincentive' rather than
a restriction on competitive practice" is a transparent distinction. Anderson v.
Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1990)
(citing Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411 (N.Y 1989)).
21. See generally Kafker, supra note 12, at 43-46; Glenn S. Draper, Comment,
Enforcing Lawyers' Covenants Not to Compete, 69 WASH. L. REV. 161, 162-71 (1994);
Christopher D. Goble, Comment, You Can't Take It With You: Enforcing Noncompeition
Agreements Between Law Firms and Withdrawing Attorneys, 30 LAND & WATER L. REv.
179, 181-91 (1995). The rule of reason test is a reasonableness test used by courts
for nearly 300 years to analyze post-employment covenants restricting competition
in other professions. See Blake, supra note 15, at 629-31. It was applied to attor-
neys from the late 19th century through the middle of the 20th century. See, e.g.,
Hicklin v. O'Brien, 138 N.E.2d 47, 52 (Ill. Ct. App. 1956); Smalley v. Greene, 3
N.W. 78, 80 (Iowa 1879); Thorn v. Dinsmoor, 178 P. 445, 445 (Kan. 1919); see also
Dwyer v.Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 501 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.) ("Reported cases in this
area are almost nonexistent."), aff'd, 348 A.2d 208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
22. See Penasack, supra note 5, at 909-13. Penasack argues that noncompeti-
tion agreements as outright bans on competition should be distinguished from
instruments Penasack assigns the more "desirable" appellation "agreements an-
ticipating competition," which allow competition but recognize some form of rec-
ompense for a law firm's "loss" of clients. Id. at 891 n.l. This phrase is justified,
Penasack believes, because it "more accurately reflects the agreements that are
now most often in existence in law firm partnership agreements, and it neutralizes
the negative implications associated with the term covenant not to compete." Id.
(citing with approval Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 414 (Hancock, J., dissenting)). How-
ever, Penasack andJudge Hancock minimize what the Cohen majority recognizes as
the inextinguishable strength of considerations of public policy: the client's, attor-
ney's, and public's respective interests. See Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 410-13.
[Vol. 23
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public's interest in preventing monopolies and productivity restrictions.2
In commercial transaction or relationship settings, courts apply a three-
part reasonableness test that balances the interests of employers, employ-
ees, and the public.24 Attorneys are treated differently: noncompetition
agreements, other than those concerning retirement benefits, are per se
unenforceable, and no effort is made to balance the parties' competing
interests. 5
Aside from a cursory examination by the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals, 6 there is no case law to date in Minnesota that addresses whether
these agreements among attorneys are valid. Economic pressures within
the legal profession may soon force a Minnesota court to decide, in a
more considered fashion, how to balance the competing interests of cli-
ent, attorney, law firm, and the public. In anticipation of that inquiry, Part
II of this Note surveys the development and application of the per se rule
and examines the reasonableness test and recent departures from the per
se rule. Part III analyzes the competing interests at stake, with special at-
tention given to arguments that the scales be tipped in favor of law firms'
economic interests, and Part IV balances the competing interests. This
Note concludes that the legal profession should not seek shelter under
the rule of reason from the problems of declining institutional loyalty, be-
cause the rule of reason treats the symptoms rather than the causes of
these problems. Important ethical considerations in the attorney-client
relationship demand a higher standard for noncompetition agreements
among attorneys than those between other professionals and business
partners. This Note recommends that Minnesota courts balance the
competing interests by applying the per se rule to these disputes.
23. See Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law and Ethics of
Grabbing and Leaving, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1, 16, 29 (1988); Blake, supra note 15, at 627.
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 188(1)(a)-(b) (1981). A post-
employment restrictive covenant will be found to restrain trade unreasonably if it
is greater than needed to protect the promisee's legitimate interest, if the prom-
isee's need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor, or if injury to the public
interest appears likely. See id.
25. See, e.g., Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 586 N.YS.2d 107, 109
(N.Y App. Div. 1992) (finding that a provision in a partnership agreement requir-
ing payment upon a partner's withdrawal is unenforceable per se as violative of
public policy), aff'd as modified, 624 N.E.2d 995, 1002 (N.Y 1993). Agreements
concerning benefits on retirement are exempt from the per se rule under both
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(A) (1969) and MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6(a) (1983) (amended 1990). Minnesota
parallels the model code and model rules' retirement exemption. See MINN. RULES
Or PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6(a) (1985).
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II. DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE PER SE RULE
A. Regulation of Restraints on Competition
Noncompetition agreements raise restraint of trade issues that have
been before courts for more than five centuries," and consequently, there is
a wealth of authority on the subject.8 In most jurisdictions, including Min-
nesota, the question of the enforceability of noncompetition covenants is
29determined by principles of common law. Only a few states, including
California, Colorado, and Texas, have enacted statutes to regulate noncom-
27. See Blake, supra note 15, at 626. "The common law's policy against re-
straint of trade is one of its oldest and best established." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS: RESTRAINT OF TRADE introductory note at 35 (1981); see also Alex-
andra Sowell, Covenants Not to Compete: A Review of the Governing Standards of Enfore-
ability After DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp. and the Legislative Amendments to the Texas
Business and Commerce Code, 45 Sw. L.J. 1009, 1009 (1991) ("The fact that courts
have adjudicated the enforceability of contractual restraints of trade in the post-
employment context for more than five hundred years indicates the serious prob-
lems created by such agreements.").
28. See Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 687-88 (Ohio
Ct. C.P. 1952); see also Blake, supra note 15, at 666 (citingJudge Earl R. Hoover's
decision in Arthur Murray as a decision to be celebrated for its trenchant wit and
cogent analysis). The Arthur Murray court considered the range of authority on
noncompetition agreements by observing:
This is not one of those questions on which the legal researcher cannot
find enough to quench his thirst. To the contrary there is so much
authority it drowns him. It is a sea - vast and vacillating, overlapping and
bewildering. One can fish out of it any kind of strange support for any-
thing, if he lives so long. This deep and unsettled sea pertaining to an
employee's covenant not to compete with his employer after termination
of employment is really Seven Seas; and now that the court has sailed
them, perhaps it should record those seas so that the next weary traveler
may be saved the terrifying time it takes just to find them.
Arthur Murray, 105 N.E.2d at 687. From its crow's nest, the court then called out
82 sightings in the "sea of periodicals," 21 in the "sea of annotations," 10 in the
"sea of encyclopedias," 10 in the "sea of treatises," 10 in the "digest sea," two in the
"restatement sea," and many more in Ohio's own sea. Id. at 687-88. Those seas'
levels have swelled significantly since Arthur Murray. More than 200 additional pe-
riodical and law review articles alone have bobbed up since Judge Hoover's mas-
terful opinion.
29. See, e.g., Xerographics, Inc. v. Thomas, 537 So. 2d 140, 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988); Lee/O'Keefe Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Ferega, 516 N.E.2d 1313, 1317 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987); Key Temp. Personnel, Inc. v. Cox, 884 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1994); Ennis v. Interstate Distrib., Inc., 598 S.W.2d 903, 907 (Tex. App. 1980);
see also Gerald T Laurie & David A. Harbeck, Balancing Business Protection With Free-
dom To Work: A Review of Noncompete Agreements in Minnesota, 23 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 107, 111 (1997). In Minnesota, "[n]oncompetition agreements are not fa-
vored at law because they partially restrain trade." Sanborn Mfg. Co. v. Currie, 500
N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (citing National Recruiters, Inc. v. Cash-
man, 323 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1982)).
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petition agreements.'0 Restrictive covenants that include a promise not to
compete in a certain geographic area, for a particular period of time, with
respect to certain activities, or regarding certain customers or clients, all in-
vite the attention of the courts, legislatures and, in the case of attorneys, eth-
ics committees and bar associations."
B. Common-Law Regulation
In settings involving commercial transactions or relationships, the
common-law policy against restraints on competition is well established. 2
While courts have long disfavored restrictions on competition, they rou-
tinely enforce restrictive covenants if those covenants are found to be rea-
sonable under the rule of reason test. 3 Reasonableness is measured by bal-
30. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1987); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-2-113 (West 1994); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.05 (West 1987). In the
1970s, several critics argued that restrictive covenants should be governed by fed-
eral antitrust law. See Goldschmid, supra note 15, at 1204-07; Charles A. Sullivan,
Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild": Antitrust Treatment of Postemployment Restraints of
Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 621, 625-32.
31. In a broad sense, every agreement regarding trade is a covenant in re-
straint of trade; it would be absurd to suggest that our legal system recognizes a
principle that all restrictive covenants are illegal and unenforceable. See Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). AsJustice Brandeis explained in
Board of Trade.
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.
To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the re-
straint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was im-
posed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts.
Id. When, however, a court finds that an overriding interest of society is incongru-
ous with the enforcement of an agreement, the court will refuse to enforce the
agreement. See infra note 33.
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (1981); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 (1993); Blake, supra note 15, at 625, 629-31.
The great majority of post-employment restrictive covenants litigated are those
that have arisen in non-legal, commercial settings. See Draper, supra note 21, at
162. An agreement to refrain from competition is the only type of agreement in
restraint of trade left to judicial development; federal antitrust laws and state stat-
utes have so dominated the field that common-law rules are of slight significance.
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.3, at 16 (2d ed. 1990); see also supra note
30 (providing examples of various statutes).
33. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 32, § 5.3, at 16; JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY
ON CONTRACTS § 98, at 513-16 (3d ed. 1990); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 187-88 (1981) (providing that such restraints are permitted only in
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ancing the promisee's legitimate interest in preventing unfair competition,
the promisor's interest in working in her chosen profession or trade, and
the public's interest in preventing monopolies and restrictions on produc-
34tion. If a court finds that enforcement of a covenant not to compete
clashes with an overriding societal interest, the court will refuse to enforce
the covenant for two basic reasons: (1) to discourage undesirable conduct,
and (2) to avoid giving the impression that the court condones such an un-
savory transaction. 5 The conflicting fundamental interests raised by com-
mercial noncompete agreements in effect have not changed since the fif-
teenth century. 6
Noncompetition agreements ancillary to a transaction or relation-
ship generally fall into three categories: those incidental to the sale of a
business; those related to employment agreements; and those involving a
partnership agreement. Employers use restrictive covenants as a means
limited circumstances). Courts have disfavored restrictions on competition for
more than 140 years. See Blake, supra note 15, at 644 (stating that in two 1851 New
York cases, the courts determined that "restraints extending over the entire state
were void"). A covenant that is overbroad in terms of geographic scope, length of
time, or line of business will be unenforceable because it is more restrictive than
needed to protect an employer's legitimate business interests. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. d (1981); 14 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1638, at 107 (3d ed. 1972). In Minnesota, when a com-
mercial restraint is "for a just and honest purpose, for the protection of a legiti-
mate interest of the party in whose favor it is imposed, reasonable as between the
parties, and not injurious to the public," it will be upheld. Bennett v. Storz Broad.
Co., 270 Minn. 525, 533, 134 N.W.2d 892, 898 (1965); see also Laurie & Harbeck,
supra note 29, at 114-15.
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981); MURRAY, supra
note 33, § 98, at 514; Blake, supra note 15, at 627. "It is the function of the law to
maintain a reasonable balance, and this requires us to recognize that there is such
a thing as unfair competition by an ex-employee as well as unreasonable oppres-
sion by an employer. The circumstances of each case must be carefully scruti-
nized." 6A ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1394, at 89 (1962); see also
Steven M. Schaeffer, Comment, Employee Restrictive Covenants: Unscrupulous Employ-
ees vs. Overreaching Employers, 27 S.D. L. REv. 220, 221-23 (1982) (discussing chal-
lenges generated by the balancing of the competing interests for employers seek-
ing to prevent misappropriation of trade secrets by former employees).
35. See MURRAY, supra note 33, § 98, at 508 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS: UNENFORCEABILITY ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY introductory note
(1981)).
36. See Blake, supra note 15, at 626-62. Blake writes:
The[] treatment [of noncompetition agreements] at the hands of the
courts has reflected the evolution of industrial technology and business
methods, as well as the ebb and flow of such social values as freedom of
contract, personal economic freedom, and business ethics. But the fun-
damental interests which come into conflict have not basically changed.
Id. at 626-27; see also id. at 631-37 (discussing the first known case on restrictive
covenants, the celebrated Dyer's Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1414)).
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(2) (1981).
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of protecting their interests in confidential information, trade secrets, and
client relationships." Employees resist post-employment contractual re-
straints because those agreements reduce employees' economic mobility
and personal freedom to follow their interests, diminish demand for their
skills by intimidating potential employer-competitors, and dampen the
dissemination of ideas, processes, and methods. Both sides often seek
the protection of the courts when they believe their interests are threat-
ened.4
The common law distinguishes attorney noncompetition agreements
from noncompetition covenants incidental to the sale of a business, and
from the general category of employment and partnership agreements
restricting post-employment competition.4' Many courts have stressed that
strong policy considerations preclude the use of commercial standards to
evaluate attorney noncompetition agreements.
42
38. See id. § 188 cmt. b; see also, e.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 324, 334-35 (D. Minn. 1980) (finding that Minnesota has sig-
nificant interest in protecting its corporations from loss of trade secrets and confi-
dential information); James S. Kemper & Co. v. Cox & Assoc., 434 So. 2d 1380
(Ala. 1983) (upholding restrictive covenant between insurance company and for-
mer employee when employee began to solicit former customers); Dynamic Air,
Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding restrictive
covenant to protect employer's commercial interests against employee's disclosure
of confidential information and trade secrets).
39. See Blake, supra note 15, at 627. Noncompetition agreements also have
been criticized for creating inefficiencies within the economy. See York M. Faulk-
ner, A Market Analysis of Anticompetition Agreements in Labor Contracts, 1991 B.YU. L.
REv. 1657, 1667-68.
40. "In this titanic struggle for protection, one cannot but sympathize with
both employer and employee. Each is needled by need; each plagued by peril."
Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 692 (Ohio Ct. C.P 1952)
(referencing 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1394, at 514 (1962) and Specific Performance
of Employee's Contract Not to Compete After a Term of Employment, 41 HARv. L. REv. 782,
784 (1928)).
41. Restrictive covenants regarding the sale of a business or post-employment
competition must be: (1) necessary to protect the business buyer's, employer's, or
partnership's legitimate interests, (2) reasonable with respect to time and territory,
(3) not unduly harsh or oppressive to the seller, employee, or departing partner,
and (4) not injurious to the public. See Arthur Murray Dance Studios, 105 N.E.2d at
691-92; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981). The Restatement (First)
of Contracts, supplanted by the Restatement (Second) in 1981, articulated a different
test: a covenant is unreasonable if it is greater than necessary for the protection of
the person for whom the restraint is imposed, imposes undue hardship on the
person restricted, or tends to create or creates a monopoly, price control, or artifi-
cial limitation on production. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 515 (1932).
42. See Blackburn v. Sweeney, 637 N.E.2d 1340, 1343 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)
(stating that the per se rule is designed to serve the public interest by maximizing
access to attorneys and precluding commercial arrangements that interfere with
that goal), vacated, 659 N.E.2d 131 (Ind. 1995). According to one court,
[c]ommercial standards may not be used to evaluate the reasonableness
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The standard of review for evaluating attorney noncompetition
agreements has evolved in three stages. Before 1961, courts analyzed post-
employment attorney noncompete covenants in the same way that those
courts treated noncompete agreements involving other professionals or
tradespeople: by subjecting those covenants, ancillary to the sale of a law
practice, to the ordinary balancing test applied to all restrictive cove-
nants.4 3  Between 1961 and 1991, these agreements were exclusively
treated under the per se rule, which barred enforcement of any restriction
on an attorney's right to practice after termination of a relationship with a
firm. Since 1991, the standard is uncertain; many courts continue to ap-
ply the per se rule,44 while a few have rejected the per se rule and reverted
to the reasonableness test's balancing of the competing interests.
45
C. Legal Ethics and the Per Se Rule
A unique process of dual regulation controls attorneys through the use
of: (1) the common-law provisions on restraints of competition that affect
anyone involved in professional or commercial activities, and (2) the inher-
ent power of state legislatures and courts, acting through bar associations,
to regulate the legal profession.46
of lawyer restrictive covenants. Strong public policy considerations pre-
clude their applicability. In that sense lawyer restrictions are injurious to
the public interest.... The attorney-client relationship is consensual,
highly fiduciary on the part of counsel, and he may do nothing which re-
stricts the right of the client to repose confidence in any counsel of his
choice. No concept of the practice of law is more deeply rooted. The lawyer's
function is to serve, but serve he must with fidelity, devotion and erudi-
tion in the highest traditions of his noble profession.
Dwyer v.Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (emphasis added);
see also Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. 1989) ("Clients are
not merchandise. Lawyers are not tradesmen. They have nothing to sell but per-
sonal service. An attempt, therefore, to barter in clients, would appear to be in-
consistent with the best concepts of our professional status.").
43. See supra note 21. As of 1960, restraints on professional employees, in-
cluding associates or technical assistants of attorneys, doctors, accountants, and
dentists, were often upheld "when the customer relationships [were] substantial."
Blake, supra note 15, at 662. The Restatement (First) of Contracts applied its rule of
reason test to restrictive covenants between attorneys. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CoNTRAcTs § 515 illus. 5 (1932).
44. See, e.g., Minge v. Weeks, 629 So. 2d 545, 547 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Weiss v.
Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey, 646 A.2d 473, 481 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1994), aff'd, 672 A.2d 1132 (N.J. 1996); Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C.,
811 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tenn. 1991).
45. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 160-61 (Cal. 1993); Haight, Brown &
Bonesteel v. Superior Court, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845, 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Jacob v.
Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 588 A.2d 1287, 1293 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991), rev'd, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992).
46. See Hillman, supra note 19, at 541-42. See generally HILLMAN, supra note 1,
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This regulation demands that attorneys owe a fiduciary duty of the
highest order to clients, and the enforceability of attorney noncompeti-
tion agreements is evaluated by ethical standards exclusively applied to
the legal profession. These unique ethical standards place attorneys in a
consensual and fiduciary relationship with clients that is distinguished
from ordinary commercial endeavors and from other professional disci-
plines, including medicine and accounting.7 These ethical rules counsel
§ 6.4 (discussing judicial expansion of statutory limitations on liability). A profes-
sion is an occupational monopoly, and society is unwilling to grant monopoly
status unless that profession is used for the public good rather than for purely self-
ish reasons. See Freidson, supra note 15, at 425-27. In Minnesota, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has the inherent power to regulate the practice of law. See Sha-
rood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 423, 210 N.W.2d 275, 279 (1973).
47. Post-employment noncompetition agreements involving accounting pro-
fessionals are subject to the same reasonableness test as those involving non-
professionals. See Kafker, supra note 12, at 34. When evaluating restrictive cove-
nants involving physicians or dentists, courts also consider the need of the public
for medical services, but disregard the needs of individual patients in having their
choice of physician. See id. at 37-41. The courts' treatment of noncompetition
agreements involving physicians has been perplexing. Courts generally enforce
medical partnership clauses that absolutely restrict a departing partner's practice.
See, e.g., Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Med. Assoc., 320 S.E.2d 170, 174 (Ga. 1984); Field
Surgical Assoc., Ltd. v. Shadab, 376 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ill. Ct. App. 1978); Gelder
Med. Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 576 (N.Y. 1977). But see, e.g., Odess v. Tay-
lor, 211 So. 2d 805, 810 (Ala. 1968) (finding that enforcement of a restraint on an
otolaryngologist from practicing within a 50-mile radius would be adverse to the
public interest); Duffner v. Alberty, 718 S.W.2d 111, 113-14 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986)
(finding that a contractual provision prohibiting an orthopedic surgeon from
practicing medicine unduly interfered with the public's right of availability to that
surgeon). For the last two decades, most courts addressing the issue of attorney
noncompetition agreements have distinguished those agreements from similar
agreements in other professions. See, e.g., Dwyer, 336 A.2d at 499. Yet, as more
than one commentator has observed, there is litde significant difference between
the interests involved in medical partnership noncompetition agreements and le-
gal partnership noncompetition agreements: physicians have personal and confi-
dential relationships with their patients, just as attorneys have with their clients,
and the "special trust patients place in their physicians merits as much if not more
protection than that of the lawyer's client." Kafker, supra note 12, at 55-56. "The
reasons for distinguishing lawyering from other professional activity are vague, and
it is questionable whether the availability of choice for the client is any less critical
when the professional engaged is a physician, for example, rather than a lawyer."
HILLMAN, supra note 1, § 2.3.3, at 2:45-:46. In addition, "[i]t
seems... unreasonable to distinguish lawyers from other professionals such as
doctors.., who also owe a high degree of skill and loyalty to their patients and
clients. The interest of a patient in a doctor of his or her choice is obviously as
significant as the interest of a litigant in a lawyer of his or her choosing." Howard,
863 P.2d at 160. But see Ladd v. Hikes, 639 P.2d 1307, 1311 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)
(Buttler, P.J., dissenting) (arguing that the per se rule should apply to physicians'
noncompetition agreements, and bitingly observing that "it is safe to say that the
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against applying ordinary commercial standards or the lower standards set
by other professions.4
These unique standards have driven the per se rule's development. 9
The genesis of the rule is a 1961 ABA Committee on Professional Ethics'
formal opinion, which declared that post-employment restrictions on an
attorney's right to practice law constituted a per se violation of legal eth-
ics. 50 The Committee continued to deal with the issue until 1969, when
the ABA formally adopted a disciplinary rule, DR 2-108, as part of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility.5' The Committee issued sev-
eral more opinions regarding these agreements until 1983, when the ABA
adopted rule 5.6 as part of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the
successor to the model code.52
D. Courts and the Per Se Rule
Although the ethical rules prohibit enforcement of noncompetition
agreements, those barriers have not stopped law firms from demonstrating
their creative drafting skills, and may even have encouraged them.5" Many
firms continue to draft creative clauses restricting competition, insert non-
compete covenants in partnership and employment agreements, and even
seek enforcement of those covenants in order to protect their perceived in-
terests.5 4 The courts, however, have not stood by idly.
48. Attorneys' ethics codes demand that the profession's members place the
client and the legal system above the lawyers' own interests; this insistence on ab-
rogating self-interest to favor the public good necessarily distinguishes a profession
from a business. See Freeman v. Freeman, 311 N.E.2d 480, 483 (N.Y. 1974).
49. The rule, however, does illustrate a deliciously ironic result of lawyers'
ethical rules: sometimes, attorneys' ethics keep them from honoring the agree-
ments they sign. Gail Diane Cox, Defect at Your Own Risk, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 1991,
at 13 (discussing Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991) and quoting Don Howarth, attorney for Haight, Brown &
Bonesteel, as stating, "What we had sounded like the ultimate lawyer joke: Law-
yers' ethics compel them not to keep the agreements they sign").
50. See supra note 17.
51. See supra note 17.
52. See supra note 17.
53. "Lawyers excel at circumventing limitations, and the ethics prohibition on
restrictive covenants has provided ample opportunity for the display of creative
lawyering." Hillman, supra note 19, at 536; see also Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d
150, 157 (Cal. 1993) ("These noncompetition clauses have grown and flourished,
despite, or in defiance of, the consistent holding of many courts across the nation
that a noncompetition clause violates the rules of professional conduct of the legal
profession."); Dwyer v.Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 499-501 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd,
348 A.2d 208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); infra note 58.
54. See Penasack, supra note 5, at 891-92. See generally HILLMAN, supra note 1,
§ 2.1.8. One commentator suggests that the reason restrictive covenants are not
more common is simple neglect: it is not uncommon for attorneys to neglect their
own interests, sometimes even to the point of not having a written partnership or
[Vol. 23
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Beginning in the mid-1970s, courts explicitly relied on the ethical
rules in fashioning a special per se rule prohibiting enforcement of these
agreements. The first important case to interpret the model code was the
1975 New Jersey case, Dwyer v. Jung.5 That court refused, under model
code DR 2-108(A), to enforce a clause in a partnership agreement that
prohibited partners from representing the firm's clients for five years after
the firm's dissolution.56 The court stressed that it must use the per se rule
to evaluate these covenants, not commercial standards under the reason-
ableness test, because of the special nature of the attorney-client relation-
ship.57 The clause directly restricted a client's fight to choose counsel and,
in the court's view, agreements that effectively interfered with clients'
fight to "their unlimited choice of counsel" were per se invalid as against
public policy.55
In 1980, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, in
In re Silverberg, held that a client-based restriction in a partnership agree-
ment amounted to a restrictive covenant and could not be arbitrated, be-
cause enforcement of the clause would violate the public policy prohibit-
ing trafficking in clients. 9  Client-based restrictive covenants seek to
dampen competition, either by forcing an attorney who competes with the
firm to forfeit some departure compensation, or by requiring that fees
paid by firm clients subsequently represented by the departing attorney
must be shared with that attorney's former partners. 60 In Silverberg, the
agreement required that the departing partner, who later represented a
client brought to the firm by the other partner, pay eighty percent of the
fees generated by the client for eighteen months. 6' The court held that
the restriction constituted a per se violation of model code DR 2-108 and
employment agreement in place. See Marks, supra note 5, at 509 n.3 (citingJewel
v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)). The partners in Jewel, "con-
trary to the sound legal advice they undoubtedly always gave their partnership cli-
ents,... had no written partnership agreement." 203 Cal. Rptr. at 15; see also
Douglas Linton, Withdrawal Pains, MANHATrAN LAw., July/Aug. 1991, at 1 (stating
that the reason usually offered for the absence of restrictive covenants in law firm
agreements is not lack of enforceability, but because attorneys often neglect to
protect their own interests).
55. 336 A.2d 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 348 A.2d 208 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1975).
56. Id. at 500-01.
57. Id. at 499-501.
58. Id. at 501. Most attorney partnership agreements after Dwyer were drafted
to avoided direct restraints on a client's right to choose counsel, and instead were
modeled on forfeiture-for-competition restrictions, which courts have upheld
against other professionals. See Kafker, supra note 12, at 43; see also infra note 63
(discussing forfeiture-for-competition clauses).
59. 427 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481-82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); see also supra note 17.
60. See Terry, supra note 5, at 1075-76.
61. Silverberg, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 481-82.
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ABA formal opinion 300, and was therefore unenforceable.
Three years later, the Oregon Court of Appeals refused to enforce a
partnership agreement clause that required a withdrawing partner to for-
feit departure compensation if that partner competed against the firm
within a three-county area."' Finding that the restrictive clause on its face
violated the public policy concerns underlying model code DR 2-108(A),
the court found that any agreement requiring an attorney to relinquish
benefits otherwise due likely would dissuade him from representing for-
mer clients, thus restricting his right to practice. 4 The drafters of the
clause argued that because the clause was a condition to payment of re-
tirement benefits, the departing partner was not actually restricted; he
only forfeited certain benefits if he continued to practice. 5 The court re-
jected this contention, saying that if the clause were read that broadly,
every withdrawal would be a "retirement" and DR 2-108(A) would be
meaningless.6
The 1989 New York Court of Appeals' opinion in Cohen v. Lord, Day
& Lord has been perhaps the most influential decision on financial forfei-
67ture clauses. Lord, Day & Lord's partnership agreement contained a
62. Id. at 482.
63. See Gray v. Martin, 663 E2d 1285, 1290 (Or. Ct. App. 1983). The type of
partnership agreement clause at issue in Gray is a forfeiture-for-competition
clause, which reduces the total reimbursement normally paid to departing attor-
neys for their capital contributions to the firm, payment of uncollected salary, and
pro rata payments for accounts receivable and work in progress, if they represent
clients of the former firm or compete with the firm for new clients. Id. at 1289-90.
These types of clauses permit competition, but at a cost; courts distinguish them
from restrictive covenants and often uphold them against physicians, veterinari-
ans, dentists, and accountants. See Mark H. Epstein & Brandon Wisoff, Winding Up
Dissolved Law Partnerships: The No-Compensation Rule and Client Choice, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 1597, 1598 (1985); Hillman, supra note 19, at 536; Kafker, supra note 12, at
43.
64. Gray, 663 P.2d at 1290-91.
65. Id. at 1290.
66. Id. The court stated:
Paragraph 25 fits squarely within the prohibition contained in DR 2-
108(A).... The agreement is not a condition to payment of retirement
benefits as plaintiffs claim. If retirement has the same meaning as with-
drawal in DR 2-108(A), then the disciplinary rule has no meaning. Every
termination of a relationship between law partners would be a retire-
ment, and agreements restricting the right to practice would always be al-
lowed.
Id.; see also Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, No. 10341/91, 1991 WL
292576, at *1 (N.Y Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 1991) (finding that a substantial monetary
penalty for failing to retire from the practice of law on withdrawal from a firm is
an impermissible restriction on the attorney's right to practice law).
67. 550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y 1989); see also Penasack, supra note 5, at 906. The
approach to noncompetition agreements articulated in Cohen has been adopted by
a number of state courts. See Penasack, supra note 5, at 906.
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clause that made payment of earned but uncollected fees contingent on a
departing partner's forbearance from competing with the firm. 8 Cohen,
a senior partner of the firm and head of its tax department, withdrew
from the firm and crossed Wall Street to join another firm; several clients
and a Lord, Day & Lord associate went with Cohen. 9 Cohen's former
partners refused to pay Cohen his $285,000 share of profits due under the
agreement because, they claimed, he violated the clause by continuing to
practice law in competition with the firm.7 ° Cohen sued, claiming that the
clause violated the per se rule under DR 2-108(A)." The court, in a strong
opinion, struck down the forfeiture-for-competition agreement, because
those agreements "functionally and realistically discourage and foreclose"
attorneys from representing clients, interfere with clients' choice of coun-
sel, and are the equivalent of restrictive covenants. 72 By putting a price on
a partner's competition with the firm, the clause violated DR 2-108(A) and
thus was unenforceable. 5
Most courts have followed Cohen and apply the per se rule essentially
to thwart law firms' attempts to contract around the ethical prohibitions
on restrictive covenants. 74 These courts have affirmed the policies under-
lying the per se rule: a client's right to choose counsel is unchecked by the
economic interests of law firms and attorneys; restrictive covenants are
unenforceable whether they seek to impose partial or total restraints on
competition; an attorney's right to practice law may not, implicitly or ex-
plicitly, be restricted by contractual arrangements; and the reasonableness
test used in commercial transaction or relationship settings may not be
applied to evaluate attorney post-employment noncompetition agree-
ments. Still, law firms, undaunted by Cohen, continue to include restrictive
covenants in their partnership and employment agreements, and they
68. Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 410; see also Brill, supra note 1, at 3 (relating a de-
lightfully droll but depressing recount of Cohen).
69. Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 411.
70. See Brill, supra note 1, at 3.
71. Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 411.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see also Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995,
1002 (N.Y. 1993) (reaffirming that court's earlier holding in Cohen).
74. See Hillman, supra note 19, at 537; see also, e.g., Blackburn v. Sweeney, 637
N.E.2d 1340 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), vacated, 659 N.E.2d 131 (Ind. 1995); Anderson
v. Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461 N.W.2d 598 (Iowa 1990); He-
her v. Smith, Stratton, Wise, Heher and Brennan, 672 A.2d 1147 (N.J. 1996);Jacob
v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992); Leonard & Butler v.
Harris, 653 A.2d 1193 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Weiss v. Carpenter, Bennett
& Morrissey, 646 A.2d 473 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 672 A.2d 1132 (N.J. 1996); Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, No.
10341/91, 1991 WL 292576 (N.Y Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 1991); Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann
& Smith, PC., 811 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. 1991).
1997]
17
Engel: Should Minnesota Abandon the Per Se Rule against Law Firm Noncomp
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAWREVIEW
persist in litigating the enforceability of these clauses. 5
E. The Reasonableness Test and Abandonments of the Per Se Rule
Several courts recently have taken a startlingly different course by rein-
troducing the reasonableness test to legitimize attorney noncompetition
76
agreements as instruments that protect firms' interests in their clients.
Balancing firms' economic interests against clients' interests in freedom of
choice and attorneys' interests in professional autonomy," these courts in-
terpret the ethical rules as permitting enforcement of indirect restrictions
on competition, so long as there is no absolute restraint on clients' or attor-
neys' interests.7 8 The courts use the reasonableness test to equate law firms
with corporations, rather than differentiating them as professional organi-
zations.7 9 The use of the reasonableness test is central to these sharp depar-
tures from precedent.
Courts analyze most post-employment noncompetition agreements
under the reasonableness test, which balances the interests of employers,
employees, and the public. Under the reasonableness test's balancing
analysis, a restrictive covenant is a reasonable restraint of trade if, under
the circumstances, it is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the
promisee, not unduly harsh to the promisor, and not likely to injure the
public.80 Because analysis under the reasonableness test is largely subjec-
tive and the circumstances of each case must be carefully scrutinized, the
test has been vigorously criticized as lacking predictability and precision."
75. SeeTerry, supra note 5, at 1075-76.
76. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 154, 156 (Cal. 1993); Haight, Brown
& Bonesteel v. Superior Court, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845, 848-49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Ja-
cob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 588 A.2d 1287, 1291, 1293 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1991), rev'd, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992).
77. The Jacob court characterized the noncompetition agreement at issue as
one that "allow[s] for the interplay of legitimate financial considerations." 588
A.2d at 1291.
78. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 157; Haight, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 848; Jacob, 588 A.2d at
1291.
79. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 154-56; Haight, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 84748, 850;Jacob,
588 A.2d at 1292-93.
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981); see also supra notes
33-35 and accompanying text.
81. E. Allen Farnsworth's criticism is particularly biting. In Farnsworth's view,
the reasonableness test is
inevitably imprecise and leaves cases to be resolved on their particular
facts, including general economic conditions. Courts view a promise in
the light of its potential as well as its actual effects .... A restraint that is
reasonable and therefore enforceable in some circumstances may be un-
reasonable and therefore unenforceable in others .... Nowhere has ju-
dicial paternalism in the service of public policy been more at war with
judicial laissez faire in the name of freedom of contract.
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Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus was the first case to question the
application of the per se rule to forfeiture-for-competition clauses. In
Jacob, a law firm's termination agreement provided that departing partners
would not receive added compensation over and above their equity inter-
est in the firm if they competed with the firm." Although the opinion was
reversed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, 4 the lower court applied the
rule of reason test to balance rule 5.6's requirements against the with-
drawals' impact on the firm's economic interests.85 The court concluded
that the termination agreement was reasonably limited, did not restrict
the withdrawing attorneys' rights to practice, and properly truncated the
firm's obligation to pay departure benefits.
86
The New Jersey Supreme Court, taking a "dim view of restrictive
covenants in employment agreements among lawyers," reversed the deci-
sion. According to the supreme court, the agreement acted as a finan-
cial forfeiture covenant, which selectively withheld compensation to dis-
courage competitive activities, and thus, under the per se rule, it
constituted an unenforceable restriction on the attorneys' rights to prac-
tice law.8 The court, however, hedged its bets, noting that while withdraw-
ing partners could inflict substantial harm on the remaining firm mem-
bers, firms could protect themselves without employing arbitrary, punitive
measures discouraging competition. 89 The firm could reduce the negative
impact on firm goodwill, the court said, by adjusting the withdrawing
partner's equity interest.9°
FARNSwORTH, supra note 32, § 5.3, at 17; see also Arthur Murray Dance Studios v.
Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 692-93 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1952); CORBIN, supra note 34, § 98.
"[T]he determination of '[w]hether a restraining covenant.., is equitable, fair,
just, and reasonably requisite ... is essentially an inquiry of fact and not a naked
matter of law.'" 14 WILLISTON, supra note 33, § 1638, at 108 (quoting Charles S.
Wood & Co. v. Kane, 125 A.2d 872, 875 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956)).
82. Jacob, 588 A.2d at 1291.
83. Id. at 1289-90.
84. Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 155 (N.J. 1992), rev'k
588 A.2d 1287 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
85. Jacob, 588 A.2d at 1290-92 (citing N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr
Rule 5.6 (1984)).
86. Id. at 1292-93 (holding that the restrictions triggered by a withdrawal were
"reasonably limited and plausibly related to preventing a double impact on the
[firm's] economic base from which the departing members' termination benefits
are to be drawn").
87. Jacob, 607 A.2d at 148.
88. Id. at 150-51.
89. Id. at 151-52.
90. Id. at 152. The court explained that it would enforce a provision in a
noncompetition agreement that deducted the law firm's actual loss of goodwill
from the withdrawing attorney's departing compensation:
[I]f a partner's departure will result in a decrease in the probability of a
client's return and a consequent decrease in prospective earnings, that
1997]
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The next departure from the per se rule was led by California's court
of appeal in Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court.9" The firm's part-
nership agreement contained a clause which required forfeiture of all
withdrawal benefits if a withdrawing partner practiced in any area regu-
larly practiced by the firm and, by doing so, represented any client of the
firm within one year after withdrawal.92
In rejecting the per se rule, the Haight court balanced the competing
interests under the reasonableness rule and found that the ethics rules did
not prohibit an attorney from compensating his or her former firm if he
or she continued to represent that firm's clients.9 Interpreting a Califor-
nia statute94 together with the state's version of model rule 5.6,9-the court
held that the partnership agreement clause was enforceable, because it
was designed not to punish a withdrawing partner but rather to protect
the firm's legitimate interests.96 In the court's view, the firm was entitled to
"preserve [its] stability... by making available the withdrawing partner's
share of capital and accounts receivable to replace the loss of the stream
of income from the clients taken ... to support the partnership's debts."
9 7
The agreement did not operate as a total restraint on competition be-
cause a withdrawing partner still could practice anywhere in California.98
The court acknowledged the principle of client choice, but it refused to
find that this policy required attorneys or their noncompetition agree-
ments to be put "in a class apart from other business and professional
partnerships."99
Abandoning the weight of authority, the California Supreme Court
in Howard v. Babcock bluntly repudiated the per se rule.00 In one of the
clearest decisions challenging the per se rule, the Howard court refused to
enforce a partnership agreement, under which partners forfeited with-
drawal compensation if they competed against the firm in the firm's prac-
tice area with several specified counties.' 1 According to the court, the
agreement "impos[ed] a reasonable toll on departing partners who com-
departure may decrease the value of the firm's goodwill. It would not be
inappropriate therefore for law partners to take that specific effect into
account in determining the shares due a departing partner.
Id.
91. 285 Cal. Rptr. 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
92. Id. at 846.
93. Id. at 848.
94. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16602 (West 1987).
95. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-500 (1994).
96. Haight, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 850.
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pete with the firm." °2
Paralleling the Haight court's interpretation of the relevant California
statute and rule of professional conduct, 1' the Howard court declared that
the agreement did not restrict the practice of law but, rather, reasonably
"attache[d] an economic consequence to a departing partner's unre-
stricted choice to pursue a particular kind of practice."1 4 The court re-
manded the case for analysis under the reasonableness rule, arguing that
a balancing of interests is required because of the "sweeping changes" that
necessitate judicial protection of the economic interests of law firms.
0 5
The Howard court also acknowledged the importance of a client's
right to choice of counsel but suggested that protecting a law firm's inter-
ests was no less important. 1°6 To further minimize the need for a per se
rule, the court asserted that, thanks to the "revolution in the practice of
law" (as reflected by the decline in institutional loyalty and the modern
realities of increased competition), "the general rules and habits of com-
merce have permeated the legal profession." 10 7 Safeguarding a firm's in-
terest is necessary, the court concluded, because a firm "has a financial in-
terest in the continued patronage of its clientele,""' and that the
102. Id.
103. See id. at 154-57; see also supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
104. Howard, 863 P.2d at 156 ("An agreement that assesses a reasonable cost
against a partner who chooses to compete with his or her former partners does not
restrict the practice of law."). The attaching "economic consequence" is difficult
to ignore: a departing partner is free to compete with his former firm, but only at
a price, and he would have to compensate the firm for a loss of clients. See id. at
160. The Howard court's reasoning is suspect: by definition, imposing an "eco-
nomic consequence" restricts a departing partner's "unrestricted" choice. See id. at
156.
105. Id. at 157. "Not the least of the changes rocking the legal profession is
the propensity of withdrawing partners... to 'grab' clients of the firm and set up a
competing practice." Id. According to the dissent, the majority presumed "that
the controlling partners of established law firms have a moral entitlement to pro-
tection from competition." Id. at 165 (KennardJ., dissenting).
106. Id. at 160. "We seek... a balance between the interest of clients in having
the attorney of choice, and the interest of law firms in a stable business environ-
ment." Id. The Howard court's concern for clients' or attorneys' rights, the pri-
mary arguments made in support of the per se rule, is unclear; earlier in the opin-
ion, the court dismissed these interests as "theoretical" because they are routinely
circumscribed. Id. at 157-58. Howard took a more limited view of the principle of
client choice than that of most courts. See id. at 158-59.
107. Id. at 159. But seeJulie A. Harris, Why Anti-Competitive Clauses Should be Un-
enforceable in Law Partnership Agreements: An Argument for ReJecting California's Ap-
proach in Howard v. Babcock, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 669, 681 (1995) (stating that
the "metaphor of revolution ... is inapt and misleading. A more accurate descrip-
tion of changes in the law profession would be a 'correction."'). What the Howard
majority "described as client-grabbing and unprofessionalism might be better un-
derstood as natural responses to changing circumstances in many law firms." Id.
108. Howard, 863 P.2d at 157 (citing Stephen E. Kalish, Covenants Not to Compete
1997]
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"economic interests of law firms [must] be protected as they are in other
business enterprises. " '°9
The results of Howard were difficult for the defendants: the $382,686
judgment they received from the trial court, affirmed by the court of ap-
peal, was set aside, and they faced potentially substantial damages on re-
mand to the trial court."' What is potentially devastating for the legal pro-
fession is that Howards holding blunts the ethical rules' purposes of
protecting the public and restraining and guiding the conduct of attor-
neys, and it glorifies the financial interests of law firms as the paramount
goal of the practice of law.
Minnesota's sole examination to date of an attorney noncompetition
agreement under model rule 5.6's per se ban is the nearly brusque Barna,
Guzy & Steffen, Ltd. v. Beens."' Barna, Guzy & Steffen's shareholder
agreement provided that if Beens left the firm to practice law elsewhere,
fifty percent of all fees Beens subsequently recovered in contingent fee
cases he handled while at Barna, Guzy was to be paid to his former firm.1
After Beens left Barna, Guzy with nine contingent fee clients in tow, the
firm sued to enforce the agreement. Beens argued the entire agree-
ment was contrary to public policy and void because it violated rule 1.5 of
the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibited the shar-
ing of legal fees by attorneys from different firms.11 4 In addition, he con-
tended that the agreement's fifty percent economic consequence clause
violated rule 5.6 of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, since
the clause was a financial disincentive that restricted Beens' future prac-
tice of law and restrained a client's right to counsel of her choice. 5
and the Legal Profession, 29 ST. Louis U. L.J. 423, 438 (1985)).
109. Id. at 156.
110. See id. at 153, 160.
111. 541 N.W.2d 354 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
112. Id. at 355.
113. Id. at 355-56.
114. Id. at 356. Beens asserted that the agreement was unenforceable under
rule 1.5(e) of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.5(e) provides:
A division of fees between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be
made only if (1) the division is in proportion to the services performed
by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer as-
sumes joint responsibility for the representation; (2) the client is advised
of the share that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the par-
ticipation of all the lawyers involved; and (3) the total fee is reasonable.
MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1990). Beens also argued
that rule 1.5(f) did not apply in his case. See Barna, 541 N.W.2d at 356. Rule 1.5(f)
"does not prohibit payment to a former partner or associate pursuant to a separa-
tion agreement." MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(f) (1990).
115. Barna, 541 N.W.2d at 356-57. Rule 5.6 provides, in part: "A lawyer shall
not participate in offering or making.., a partnership or employment agreement
that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relation-
ship .... " MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6 (1990); see also supra
[Vol. 23
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The Minnesota Court of Appeals wasted no time in dismissing Beens'
first argument. Without directly addressing why it believed the agreement
did not violate rule 1.5(e), and despite its acknowledgment that a contract
that offends "a value of great public importance" is void, the court gave
only a hint why the shareholder agreement would be upheld: "[T] he en-
forcement of freely-made contracts is itself in the public interest. 1 1 6 Beens
asserted that rule 1.5(f) did not apply, because the agreement's plain lan-
guage required a payment from the partner, while the rule required pay-
ment to a former partner."7 The court answered this with a circular policy
argument that rule 1.5(f) was designed to "encourage law firms to care-
fully draft agreements in order to prevent disputes when partners or asso-
ciates leave a firm.""8 To ensure there was no question regarding its
agenda, the court noted - with no warning or cited authority - that public
policy required law firms to be judicially insulated from instability"9
The court's analysis of Beens' rule 5.6 argument covered two para-
graphs. 2 0 After acknowledging the unenforceability of law firm agree-
ments restricting an attorney's interest in professional autonomy, 2 ' the
court - claiming that its focus was on the client's interest in freedom of
choice122 and declaring that the situation could be distinguished from di-
123rect restraint cases - insisted that the fifty percent economic conse-
quence clause did not restrict client choice because it did not "effectively
note 17.
116. Barna, 541 N.W.2d at 356.
117. Id.
118. Id. "Disputes such as this are best averted by properly drafted partnership
and associate agreements." Id. (citing La Mantia v. Durst, 561 A.2d 275, 279 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)).
119. Id. ("If such agreements cannot be enforced, law firms will face instability
because attorneys will be motivated to leave firms when they receive lucrative con-
tingent fee cases, and attorneys will be encouraged to battle over clients.").
120. Id. at 357.
121. Id. (citing Anderson v. Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461
N.W.2d 598, 601-02 (Iowa 1990);Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d
142, 148-49 (N.J. 1992); Leonard & Butler, P.C. v. Harris, 653 A.2d 1193, 1196,
1199 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Dwyer v. Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 501 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 348 A.2d 208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975)).
122. Barna, 541 N.W.2d at 357. Insisting that "[t]he focus of our decision is
the client," the court cited Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus for the proposition
that the underlying purpose of rule 5.6 "is to ensure the freedom of clients to se-
lect counsel of their choice, despite its wording in terms of the lawyer's right to
practice." Id.
123. Id. Like Barna, the partnership clause in Dwyer was a direct restraint on a
client's right to choose counsel. The Dwyer court refused, under the per se rule, to
enforce that clause, which prohibited partners from representing the firm's clients
for five years after the firm's dissolution, because the clause directly restricted a
client's interest in freedom of choice. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying
text. Although it cited Dwyer, the Barna court failed to see the parallels between
Dwyer and the case then before it.
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penalize [] an attorney for continuing to represent certain clients."12 4 Fail-
ing to notice any impairment of client choice or attorney autonomy, the
court held that there was no violation of rule 5.6 of the Minnesota Rules
of Professional Conduct. '25
III. THE COMPETING INTERESTS
A. The Client's Interest in Freedom of Choice
The client's right to her choice of counsel is one of the most basic and
deeply rooted concepts in the practice of law.12 6 The protection of a client's
freedom to choose her own attorney serves the public interest, and the eth-
ics rules were drafted to protect and advance the client's interest. 127 The cli-
ent's interest in freedom of choice is also promoted by ethical prohibitions
on restrictions of an attorney's right to professional autonomy, which were
adopted primarily to prevent attorneys from entering into agreements that
limit clients' freedom to choose counsel. 18 The attorney-client relationship
124. Barna, 541 N.W.2d at 357. Beens, the court insisted,
will still receive 50% of the contingency fee.... The agreement cannot
serve as a financial disincentive because Beens would have received less
than 50% ... if he had remained at the firm. Because there is no incen-
tive for him to terminate his representation of [the client], [the client's]
interests are not affected.
Id. However, an imposition of an economic consequence on competitive behavior
can also work to dissuade, if not prohibit, reasonably competitive behavior. The
cost to compete may be significant enough to encourage an attorney to give up a
client, "thereby interfering with the lawyer-client relationship and, more impor-
tandy, with clients' free choice of counsel. Those provisions thus cause indirectly
the same objectionable restraints on the free practice of law as more direct restric-
tive covenants." Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 148-49 (N.J.
1992).
125. Barna, 541 N.W.2d at 357.
126. See Dwyer, 336 A.2d at 500; see also supra note 42.
127. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 165 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dis-
senting) (citing Ames v. State Bar, 506 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1973)); Draper, supra note 21,
at 174 ("Protecting client choice is an important value served by the ethical rules
governing attorneys."); see also supra note 18.
128. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108 (1969); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6 (1990); see also 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 824 (2d ed. Supp. 1992); supra notes 5, 17 (ex-
plaining professionalism and the per se ban on noncompetition agreements). Al-
though the ethics rules provide that, in limited situations, the principle of client
choice yields to other interests, the policy of freedom to choose counsel remains
paramount for virtually all courts. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1987) (conflict of interest), and id. Rule 1.9 (1987) (conflict of
interest in same or substantially related matter), and id. Rule 1.16(b) (1983)
(withdrawal from representation for non-payment or unreasonable financial bur-
den), and id. Rule 1.17 (1990) (seller of firm may not compete with buyer), with
[Vol. 23
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is a highly personal one, and the client's confidence in her attorney is vital
to the attorney's ability to represent that client effectively. 129 Insuring that
counsel is available to clients protects clients' freedom to choose counsel. °
Moreover, the wider the pool of available, competent practitioners, the
more effectively clients may choose representation meeting their legal and
economic requirements.
B. The Attorney's Interest in Professional Autonomy
The same ethics rules that shield clients' interests in freedom to
choose counsel also protect attorneys' interests in freedom of movement to
practice law. 3' Post-employment restrictions on an attorney's ability to prac-
tice his profession in terms of place, time, and/or clients unreasonably re-
strict the attorney's right to economic mobility and personal freedom to fol-
low her interests. 32 By limiting the autonomy of attorneys, these restrictions
also circumscribe a client's interest in freedom of choice, because they nar-
row the number and availability of attorneys to clients and because they
tend to unfairly weaken the attorney's bargaining position with prospective
partners and employers.'
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIY EC 2-26 (1977) ("A lawyer is under
no obligation to act as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to be-
come his client; but in furtherance of the objective of the bar to make legal services fully
available, a lawyer should not lightly decline proffered employment." (emphasis
added)), and id. EC 2-28 (1977) ("The personal preference of a lawyer to avoid
adversar[ial] alignments.., does not justify his rejection of tendered employ-
ment."). See generally HILLMAN, supra note 1, § 2.7.
129. See Epstein & Wisoff, supra note 63, at 1604. The rationale for the client's
interest in freedom of choice is rooted in "the unique role that attorneys play in
counseling clients." Id.
130. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Considerations in Withdrawal, Expulsion,
and Retirement, WITHDRAwAL, RETIREMENT & DISPUTES: WHAT YOU AND YOUR FIRM
NEED TO KNow 32 (Edward B. Berger ed., 1986) ("[R]estrictions limit the oppor-
tunity of present clients of the firm, and of prospective clients, to select the lawyer
of their choice.").
131. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108 (1969); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6 (1990); see also 2 HAZARD & HODES, su-
pra note 128, at 824; supra notes 5, 13-14, 17 (discussing the principles of both at-
torney choice and client choice).
132. See supra note 14.
133. See Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. 1989); see also
Blake, supra note 15, at 627 (stating that these restraints "unfairly weaken the indi-
vidual employee's bargaining position vis-a-vis his employer and, from the social
point of view, clog the market's channeling of manpower to employments in which
its productivity is greatest"); supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text (discussing
the client's freedom to choose counsel); infra text accompanying notes 181-83
(discussing the client's freedom to choose counsel).
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C. The Law Firm's Interest in Stability and Protection From Withdrawing
Partners
The practice of law is not only a profession; it is a business operating in
a competitive environment. As competition increases, law firms become
increasingly volatile institutions.29
Since law firms are also commercial organizations, they have an in-
terest in protecting their financial resources, which most importantly are
their client bases.136 Courts recognize that firms have a financial interest
in the continued patronage of their clients. -7 If the law does not permit a
firm to protect its interests, attorneys may have less incentive to promote
the firm's practice, an undesirable result as firm specialization increases.
'38
The firm, in turn, will be less inclined to invest capital in itself, making it
less attractive to clients and to prospective partners which, in turn, will re-
duce the firm's goodwill or anticipated revenue from clients, accelerating
the firm's instability. The greater the level of instability, the more likely it
is that the firm ultimately will dissolve, thus limiting the number of firms
in the legal services market from which clients may choose. 3 9 Law firm
instability already has had disastrous effects on clients.14 Any service firm
that ignores the economic climate in which it operates will not long re-
main in existence to service clients.
The firm, through its partners and associates, represents the client,
although the client also may have a relationship with a withdrawing part-
134. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 157 (Cal. 1993); Haight, Brown &
Bonesteel v. Superior Court, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845, 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
135. See HILLMAN, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 1:1-:3.
136. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 159-60. "Law firms have an affirmative obligation
to the client to provide an atmosphere most conducive to the development of the
attorney-client relationship and to the efficient, diligent completion of work." Id.
(citing Penasack, supra note 5, at 890-91).
137. See, e.g., id. at 157 (citing Kalish, supra note 108, at 438). This financial
interest is recognized as goodwill, a property interest that inures to the firm. See
Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 152 (N.J. 1992) (stating that
goodwill is "[t]he probability of future patronage [that] can be translated into
prospective earnings").
138. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 160. "In an environment of pervasive lateral hir-
ing, partners may be loath to financially or otherwise support the development of
a colleague's relations with particular clients because the colleague may later ex-
clusively usurp the benefits of that relationship." Penasack, supra note 5, at 891,
quoted in Howard, 863 P.2d at 160.
139. However, some of the dissolving firm's partners and market share are
likely to be absorbed by other firms, while other partners will form new firms that
serve some of the former firm's clients as well as new clients. See Harris, supra note
107, at 679. Thus, dissolution may actually result in an increase in the range of
client choice and a better overall allocation of market resources. See id.
140. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 159; Penasack, supra note 5, at 890-91.
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ner. A client's interests are likely to be furthered when all members of the
firm are available as needed. Noncompetition agreements give the firm
the ability to assure that the client's and its own interests are properly pro-
tected.
Withdrawing partners who are not constrained by noncompetition
agreements may violate their fiduciary duties to clients and to the firm's
partners.1 4 ' A partner negotiating to join another firm may reveal sensitive
information regarding clients who are likely to follow that partner to the
new firm. In addition, withdrawing from the firm without timely notice
may put unreasonable pressures on the firm's economic resources, com-
promise logistical planning, and even leave the withdrawing partner little
choice but to violate the duty to "tell the truth" if rumors about the with-
drawal develop.
Many of the assumptions backing the ethical requirements no longer
apply in the economic environment now facing law firms, and the law
should recognize this problem.4 2 For example, there is no reason to dif-
ferentiate between attorneys and other professionals, such as physicians or
accountants, who also owe fiduciary duties to their clients and whose pro-
fessional relationships with their clients are, likewise, confidential, inti-
mate, and consensual.' 43 Law firms have the same legitimate interests in
protecting their continued stability that other professional firms do, yet
medical practices and accounting firms are not subject to a per se rule
that prohibits them from maintaining their stability through noncompeti-
tion agreements. Noncompetition agreements levy reasonable costs on
competition, and thus law firms should have the same right that other
professional firms do to have reasonable noncompetition agreements up-
held by the courts. ' 4
Firms must be able to limit the erosion of their economic interests
that the per se rule causes. Noncompetition agreements that meet the
reasonableness test should be permitted so long as those agreements do
not prohibition competition outright. Furthermore, attaching an eco-
nomic consequence, a reasonable cost to compete, to a withdrawing part-
ner's decision to compete does not restrict competition, a client's choice
141. See Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Ethics and the Law of Con-
tract Juxtaposed: A Jaundiced View of Professional Responsibility Considerations in the At-
torney-Client Relationship, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 791, 792-94, 837-46 (1991); Pe-
nasack, supra note 5, at 901.
142. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 157.
143. See id. at 160. But see Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1171 (N.J. 1978)
(Sullivan, J., dissenting) (finding that both the doctor-patient and lawyer-client
.relationships are consensual, highly fiduciary and peculiarly dependent on the
patient's or client's trust and confidence in the physician consulted or attorney
retained"); supra note 47 (explaining that an attorney's relationship with his client
is distinguishable from other professional relationships).
144. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 160.
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of counsel, or attorney autonomy. 45 Restrictive covenants reasonably pro-
tect the firm against economic loss, especially in light of the financial bur-
dens that a partner's competitive departure might impose on the firm and
the remaining partners.'4 Thus, efforts to protect law firm stability, such
as protecting firms' interests in stable clients and protection from with-
drawing partners, advance client choice, attorney autonomy, and public
freedom from monopolistic activities.
D. The Public's Interest in Preventing Monopolies and Restrictions On
Production
The public's need for legal services dictates that attorneys should not
be unreasonably restricted from the practice of law. Prohibiting the en-
forcement of noncompetition agreements checks the commercialization of
the profession. 48 It also lessens the likelihood that ethical standards will
erode further, an especially sensitive situation given that public perceptions
141of attorneys continue to worsen. Without such a limitation, a license to
practice law may become nothing more than a permit to make money.150
Restraints lessen competition by bullying potential competitors and
clogging the dissemination of potentially valuable ideas, processes, and
methods. 15' Restraints also prevent market forces from channeling talent
to areas where that talent's productivity will be maximized, and they tend
to create monopolies whose access costs to the public are higher.
145. See id. at 156.
146. See id., 863 P.2d at 160; Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court, 285
Cal. Rptr. 845, 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus,
588 A.2d 1287, 1291 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), rev'd, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J.
1992).
147. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACTS § 188 cmt. h, illus. 14 (1981).
148. See Kevin T. Caiaccio, Howard v. Babcock, The Business of Law Versus the Eth-
ics of Lawyers: Are Noncompetition Covenants Among Law Partners Against Public Policy ?,
28 GA. L. REv. 807, 827-30 (1994); Harris, supra note 107, at 681-85.
149. See Andrea Sachs, First, Kiss All the Lawyers, TIME, Aug. 16, 1993, at 39
("[L]awyer bashing has become a beloved pastime."); Randall Samborn, Anti-
Lawyer Attitude Up But NLJ/West Poll Also Shows More People Are Using Attorneys, NAT'L
LJ., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1 ("[R]esentment of lawyers - ranging from lawyer-bashing
jokes to outright vilification - is running at a fever pitch.").
150. See Ladd v. Hikes, 639 P.2d 1307, 1311 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (Buttler, P.J.,
dissenting).
It may be that both the medical and legal professions are progressing to-
ward becoming nothing more than commercial enterprises and that a li-
cense to practice either profession is no more than a permit to make
money by selling services, much as a fishmonger sells his wares. If that be
the case, it is a doleful thought and the courts ought not accelerate the
process.
Id.
151. See Blake, supra note 15, at 627.
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IV. BALANCING THE COMPETING INTERESTS
The choices regarding the question of the enforceability of attorney
noncompetition agreements narrow to only two: either all of these agree-
ments are unenforceable under a per se rule; or some are enforceable while
others are not, meaning that a rule of reason approach would be proper
and a per se rule would be unnecessary. Under the second choice, unen-
forceable agreements would be those that impose disincentives large
enough to discourage attorneys from representing clients of their former
firm. The critical problem is deciding where to draw the line. Since Solo-
monic wisdom and discretion are rare commodities, the prudent approach
is to employ the option that better promotes the legal profession's special
responsibilities and ethical obligations, and is more likely to deliver predict-
ability and precision: the per se rule.
A. Client and Attorney Interests are Superior to Firm Interests
Law firms have legitimate, protectable interests, but the interests of es-
tablished firms are not superior to the interests of clients or attorneys.
15 2
While attorneys owe fiduciary duties to their firms and partners,5 3 the fidu-
ciary nature of the attorney-client relationship justifies elevating the rights
of clients over the interests of firms. Law firms' legitimate interests in pro-
tecting client patronage and client confidences are adequately protected by
the enforcement of anti-solicitation and anti-disclosure provisions of the
model rules.
15 4
Although every noncompetition agreement operates in a unique fac-
tual context, each situation presents incentives to compete or not to com-
pete. The imposition of "economic consequences" on competitive action
may be equivalent to a prohibition on competition or an assessment of a
reasonable cost against a withdrawing partner who decides to compete.155
This cost to compete may be large enough to encourage an attorney to
give up a client, "thereby interfering with the lawyer-client relationship
and, more importantly, with clients' free choice of counsel." 15 6 An "eco-
152. The Cohen court recognized that protection of a law firm's economic
health constitutes a legitimate interest, but it concluded that this interest cannot
be protected by contracts for the forfeiture of income earned by withdrawing
partners during their service at the firm. Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d
410, 413 (N.Y. 1989).
153. For example, a partner has special duties of loyalty and disclosure to fel-
low partners beyond that of others in the firm, because a partner stands in a spe-
cial position of trust and confidence with his partners. See Blake, supra note 15, at
655; Marks, supra note 5, at 53640.
154. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
155. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 163 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dis-
senting).
156. Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 148 (N.J. 1992),
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nomic consequence" which requires the forfeiture of a significant per-
centage of profits from work already completed or yet to be performed
may be onerous enough to dissuade many attorneys from the practice of
law.' 57 Even if the cost imposed on a withdrawing partner to compete with
his former firm does not effectively prohibit the attorney from represent-
ing a particular client, because the financial consequences do not make
representation totally unfeasible, that imposed cost will reduce the attor-
ney's expected profit from his work for that client. What arises, then, is a
significant disincentive to represent the former firm's clients, even if they
want to be represented by the withdrawing partner. Thus, client choice
is diminished, attorney autonomy is restricted, and competition is unrea-
sonably impeded.
The leading case advocating abandonment of the per se rule pro-
claimed that its application of the reasonableness test reached "a balance
between the interests of clients in having the attorney of choice, and the
interest of law firms in a stable business environment." 59 However, the
Howard court gave no indication of how it balanced clients' interests
against the firm's interest in retaining its clients. Without articulation of a
clear, predictable standard of how clients' interests are accommodated, '°
the only reasonable conclusion - given the court's emphasis on the com-
mercial revolution in the practice of law' 6' - is that Howard inappropriately
favored the firm's interest in the balancing.
62
Given how interrelated the policy principles of client choice and at-
torney autonomy are, the elevation of firms' financial interests over attor-
neys' interests may produce particularly undesirable effects. For example,
a productive partner whose departure from a firm saddled with unpro-
ductive partners would otherwise be justified, 6 might be precluded under
quoted in Howard, 863 P.2d at 163 (Kennard, J. dissenting). "Those provisions thus
cause indirectly the same objectionable restraints on the free practice of law as
more direct restrictive covenants." Id. at 148-49.
157. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 159.
158. See Harris, supra note 107, at 681.
159. Howard, 863 P2d at 160.
160. See Hillman, supra note 19, at 547.
161. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 156-60. "[A] revolution in the practice of law has
occurred requiring economic interests of the law firm to be protected as they are
in other business enterprises." Id. at 156. But see Harris, supra note 107, at 681
(suggesting the majority's revolution metaphor in Howard is "inapt and mislead-
ing").
162. One commentator dryly observed that the Howard decision was "a Jurassic
Park effort to protect the dinosaurs." Victoria Slind-Flor, Non-Compete Clauses Ap-
proved: California Goes Own Way, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 1993, at 3 (quoting Paul W.
Vapnik, author of amicus brief filed in the case for the California State Bar). See
generally Hillman, supra note 19, at 533.
163. In fact, partners often have good cause to leave a firm, such as: frustration
with the size of the organization, differences over management goals or style, lack
of satisfactory advancement opportunities, and personality clashes between part-
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the reasonableness test from leaving the firm so she could make a living.'6
A firm's reasonable expectancy of court-awarded superior interests in cli-
entele over the competing claims of withdrawing partners would tend to
discourage withdrawal and to diminish client choice and lawyer auton-165
omy. Moreover, a client's loyalty to a firm often results from a relation-
ship with and efforts by a particular partner, rather than from the envi-
ronment provided by the firm. 6 6 Enforcing noncompetition agreements
would allow a firm unreasonably to prevent a willing client from employ-
ing a willing attorney.
If courts spurn the per se rule and instead analyze these agreements
under the rule of reason, litigation will increase, because withdrawing
partners will be forced to assert their only argument: that the agreement is
a penalty rather than a reasonable restriction on competition. The per
se rule, as a bright line test, establishes certainty and reduces the likeli-
hood of litigation, freeing attorneys to attend to clients' needs.
The assertion that firms have an economic interest in the continuing
patronage of their clientele actually describes the interests of the partners
of the firm, rather than the interests of the economic entity distinct from
its constituents.'6 "Protecting the firm's interest" actually favors the inter-
ners. See Gary A. Munneke, Law Firm Restructuring: The Big Picture, L. PRAC. MGMT.,
Apr. 1993, at 38-40 ("Why do law firms break up? The simple answer is that part-
ners do not get along. It is unlikely that any of the changes the legal profession
has undergone will alter the fact that personality conflicts are a fact of life in every
office.").
164. See Harris, supra note 107, at 685 ("[D]eparting partners may simply be
rationally responding to a variety of recent developments and trends in law firm
practice."). "Justice Joyce Kennard's dissent [in Howard] echoed similar senti-
ments by remarking that rules that limit competition unfairly enrich members of a
firm who are maybe less productive than departing partners." Id. at 685.
165. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 163-66 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
166. See id. at 166. In the dissenting opinion,Justice Kennard explained:
Clients remain loyal to a firm for many reasons that have no connection
to existing partners' capital. The labor and efforts of attorneys and other
employees of law firms contribute much more to the recruitment, reten-
tion, and development of clients than the capital of a law firm. Indeed, if
a client chooses to be represented by a departing attorney rather than
the law firm, that choice is generally based on the client's trust and con-
fidence in the withdrawing attorney.
Id.
167. See Caiaccio, supra note 148, at 835. The Howard court held that a restric-
tive covenant may be reasonable under the rule of reason test if it is considered to
be a liquidated damages clause. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 160. But "[a]n amount
disproportionate to the anticipated damages is termed a 'penalty.' A contractual
provision imposing a 'penalty' is ineffective, and the wronged party can collect
only the actual damages sustained." Id. (citing Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702
P.2d 503, 515 (Cal. 1985)).
168. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 157; Hillman, supra note 19, at 550-51.
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ests of partners who remain over those partners who withdraw.'6 9
This allows firms to commandeer, at the withdrawing partner's ex-
pense, the value that the market attaches to a withdrawing partner with a
loyal following of clients. To argue that law firm stability is improved
through the enforcement of postemployment noncompetition agree-
ments actually only caters to one group of attorneys over others without
any improvement in firm stability. 70 Furthermore, claims that the clients'
fortunes are tied to the stability of their attorneys' firms lack foundation."'
There is no evidence to support the charge that law firm instability has
had a "disastrous impact" on clients.
72
Any incentive for a firm to correct the internal conditions which
drive attorneys away will be reduced if barriers to departure are estab-
lished through the enforcement of these agreements. Institutional loyalty
continues to diminish as the legal profession adjusts to internal pressures
and market conditions.17 By favoring partners who stay over those who
withdraw, enforcement of noncompete agreements only "treats the symp-
toms rather than the causes of firm instability."
74
169. See Harris, supra note 107, at 679-81. One commentator notes that the
departure of law partners who are responding to declining systems within their
firm should act "as a catalyst for change that improves competitive, efficient, and
functional behavior within the firm." Id. at 679. Often, however, changes do not
occur, because the remaining partners at the firm are more interested in adopting
"practices designed to prevent further partner departures," such as noncompeti-
tion agreements, which protect the firm's client base rather than addressing the
reasons for the firm's declining institutional systems. Id. at 680 n.83.
170. See id. at 681. Faced with the financial burdens the agreement would im-
pose upon exit from the firm, many attorneys might be inclined to stay within
their present but unsatisfactory firm. See id. The firm's structural problems will
likely remain unexamined and unchecked, and the firm - whose governing part-
ners see no reason for alarm - remains insulated from change. "Stability" - here
the lack of change and growth - is promoted, but the cost is potentially prohibi-
tive. See id.
171. See Hillman, supra note 19, at 548, 550. "Experience suggests.., that law
firm instability is far more a concern of lawyers than their clients." Id. at 548.
172. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 166 n.2 (Kennard,J., dissenting) (questioning the
majority's assertion that jurisdictions prohibiting restrictive covenants harm law
firms and doubting that "such evidence exists"). Penasack offered only specula-
tion, rather than evidence, for the claim that the decline in institutional loyalty has
had a "disastrous impact" on clients. See Penasack, supra note 5, at 890-91.
173. See Harris, supra note 107, at 681-82 (discussing recent challenges to a
"bigger is better" firm mentality).
174. Hillman, supra note 19, at 553; see also Harris, supra note 107, at 684 (not-
ing that the majority's decision in Howard "may end up offering protection to
those who need it least").
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B. The Ethical Rules Mandate a Higher Standard for Attorneys Than for Other
Professionals
The practice of law remains a profession despite the challenges facing
the legal business environment. Even if the law is more of a business now
than when the ethics rules were promulgated - a claim that has been suc-
cessfully challenged'75 - clients' and attorneys' rights and interests have not
changed. The objective of setting legal ethical standards is not to "achieve
consensus at the level of the lowest common denominator."176 The long-
standing, well-established rules of legal ethics 177 should not be abrogated
simply because other professions have set less demanding standards. 17
These rules exist not for the attorney's or law firm's protection, but rather
for the protection of the client, whose interests the attorney and firm are
hired to represent. Requiring that noncompetition agreements be subject
to the rule of reason neglects the superior, competing interests of clients
and attorneys.
Furthermore, allowing the conditions now facing law firms to over-
ride traditional ethical requirements likely will promote further erosion of
legal ethics and law practice. At a time when public perceptions of at-
torneys remain embarrassingly grim, courts should have no patience for
175. See Phillip J. Nexon, The Business of the Law in the 1990s, 45 S.C. L. REV.
1063 (1994) (examining the historical development of the practice of law since
the 19th century, but focussing primarily on the post-World War II period). Nexon
makes a strong case for the assertion that the business of law as it is conducted in
the 1990s is not essentially different from what it was in the 1940s and 1950s:
[Tihe essential character of the private practice of law in the nineties as
conducted by [private practice] law firms is not qualitatively different
from what it was in the "good old days," which for present purposes
means the world of lawyers in practice forty to fifty years ago. The "essen-
tial character" to which I refer is the commercial - money getting - at-
tribute of private practice, and the thesis advanced in these pages is that
the practice of law in the areas addressed is a business today, and it was a
business in the good old days.
Id. at 1064.
176. Howard, 863 P2d at 166 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("[A]ttorneys should
strive to, and should be required to, meet the highest ethical standards.").
177. See supra note 43.
178. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 166 (Kennard,J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 164 (Kennard,J., dissenting). As Justice Kennard explained, "A
profession has ideals and objectives beyond economic success." Id.
It would be idle to assert that there is nothing of selfishness in the pursuit
of a profession. But its ideal is not one of individual success in competi-
tive acquisitive activity. And because ideals operate powerfully to shape
action, professional activity, even at its worst, is restrained and guided by
something better than the desire for money rewards.
Roscoe Pound, What is a Profession? The Rise of Legal Profession in Antiquity, 19
NOTRE DAME 203, 205 (1944)).
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anything that allows ethical standards to deteriorate further.
8 0
C. Client Interests are Best Protected by the Per Se Rule
The symbiotic relationship between clients' interests and attorney
autonomy justifies the regulation of attorneys under the ethical rules.1
8'
Neither law firms nor attorneys have a superior financial or any other pro-
prietary interest in clients.8 2 The ethical basis for the per se rule - that at-
torneys should not barter in clients because clients are not merchandise -
protects clients by assuring that their interests are properly represented. 3
This requirement also protects the practice's desirable status as a profession.
Compensating a firm for losses from competition does not accommo-
date the interests of clients. The "disastrous impact" of firm instability on
clients' interests is ephemeral. In fact, the willingness of large numbers of
clients to follow their attorneys from firm to firm indicates that problems
of firm instability may expand client choice through increased movement
of partners between competing firms.8 4 Defensive management policies
prompted by firm instability may also enhance client choice, because
partners may believe those policies are inconsistent with clients' inter-
ests.185
D. The Attorney's Interests in Professional Autonomy Better Protect Clients'
Interests
There is no fundamental right to restrictions on competition. Since
180. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 166 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("If the practice of
law is to remain a profession and retain public confidence and respect, it must be
guided by something better than the objective of accumulating wealth.").
181. The availability of counsel promotes clients' freedom to choose counsel:
the greater number of available professionals, the more effectively clients may ex-
ercise that choice. Conversely, limitations on attorneys' right to practice limits
their autonomy, which in turn limits the pool of practitioners available to be con-
sidered by a client. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
182. See Kelly v. Smith, 611 N.E.2d 118, 122 (Ind. 1993) ("Although the firm
may refer to clients of the firm as 'the firm's clients,' clients are not the 'posses-
sion' of anyone, but, to the contrary, control who will represent them.").
183. See Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. 1989). "Clients
are not merchandise. Lawyers are not tradesmen .. .. An attempt, therefore, to
barter in clients, would appear to be inconsistent with the best concepts of [attor-
neys'] professional status." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 300
(1961), quoted in Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 411.
184. See Hillman, supra note 19, at 549-50.
185. See id. "[C]onflict-of-interest considerations and attendant incompatibili-
ties of clients within the firm or ... personality differences that have led to discord
and undermined the ability of firm members to respond to the needs of their cli-
ents ... may serve the needs of the clients affected." Id. (citing MODEL RuLES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1987)).
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covenants not to compete restrict competition, they must be narrowly tai-
lored even under the application of the reasonableness test in the ordinary
business context.1 86
The right at issue here is the attorney's freedom to compete. Remov-
ing restrictions on an attorney's professional autonomy enhances her
economic mobility and personal freedom to follow her interests. Fur-
thermore, an attorney stands in a better bargaining position with prospec-
tive employers and partnerships when there is broader competition for
the attorney's skills. The achievement of these policy goals in turn en-
courages client freedom of choice. The reciprocal interests of client and
attorney established under the ethical standards are best protected by the
predictability and certainty of the per se rule.
V. CONCLUSION
Three courts sharply split from thirty years of precedent recently, in
holding that postemployment noncompetition agreements between attor-
neys and law firms are enforceable. In trying to address the problems of the
decline in institutional loyalty and the increase in law firm instability, these
courts abandoned the ethically-based per se rule and instead applied the
lower, commercial standards of the ordinary reasonableness test, which
seeks to balance the competing interests of clients, attorneys, law firms, and
the public.
The reasonableness test, as employed by these courts, unreasonably
favors the interests of law firms at the expense of clients' freedom of
choice, attorneys' freedom of autonomy, and the public's interest in pre-
venting monopolies. The reasonableness test also provides no relief for
the causes of the problems now facing law firms, and instead merely treats
the symptoms of those problems. The current ethics rules require that a
higher standard be applied to attorney noncompetition agreements:
agreements that preclude lawyers from representing clients violate the re-
ciprocal interests of clients and attorneys.
Protection of client, attorney, and public interests are the consider-
ations that inspire and steer the per se rule. In light of the purposes that
energize the ethical rules, the balancing of the competing interests is best
served by Minnesota courts interpreting attorney noncompetition agree-
ments under the per se rule.
Kenneth Engel
186. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
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